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RECOGNITION OF ILLEGALITIES, PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM, AND IMPLEMENTED REFORMS IN THE
SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM UNDER
GORBACHEV, GLASNOST, AND PERESTROIKA
David M. Simmons*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the last several decades, Soviet jurists have referred to
various "errors" and "mistakes" in the Soviet criminal justice system.1
They usually failed, however, to further elaborate upon these vague ref-
erences.2 Since the accession of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev to the
position of General Secretary in the spring of 1985, many Soviet ju-
rists, as well as numerous journalists, academics, and members of the
general public have expounded upon these errors and mistakes with a
surprising degree of candidness and vehemence.3 During the past four
years, Soviet newspapers have published numerous detailed and alarm-
ing accounts of convictions of clearly innocent citizens, illegally ob-
tained confessions that are often erroneous, the unofficial but influential
role of Communist Party (Party) officials in the prosecution process,
and the exceedingly low level of acquittals due to judges' fears of retri-
bution from unhappy members of the bureaucracy.4
* J.D. Candidate, 1991. Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See Wrobel, Glasnost' and Soviet Criminal Trials, in YEARBOOK ON SocIALIsr
LEGAL SYSTEMS-1987 167-68 (W. E. Butler ed. 1988) (noting that for many years
Soviet jurists have written about "errors" and "mistakes" in the criminal law).
2. Id.
3. See Shelley, Criminal Law and Justice Since Brezhnev, in LAw AND TIE
GORBACHEV ERA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DIETRICH ANDRE LOEBER 183 (D.D. Barry
ed. 1988) (finding that Gorbachev's accession resulted in shocking disclosures of cor-
ruption and cruelty in the Soviet justice system); Does The Judicial System Need Re-
form?, 38 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 42, at 1 (1986) [hereinafter Judicial Re-
forms] (discussing deficiencies of the Soviet criminal system). In late 1986, for
example, R. Kudryavtsev, Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of
State and Law, stated that the Soviet Union lacks well-trained lawyers, denies crucial
rights to defense counsel (and thus, the defendants they represent), needs to eliminate
judicial accusatory bias, and must punish frequent outright violations of procedural
legality by the Soviet Procuracy. Id.
4. Solomon, The Role of Defense Counsel in the USSR. the Politics of Judicial
Reform Under Gorbachev, 30 CRIM. L. Q. 83 (1988); see Tselms, Verdict in Murder
Trial Based on Coerced Confessions Overturned by Lucky Accident, 38 CURRENT DIG.
SOVIET PRESS No. 42, at 5 (1986) (providing a detailed account of a trial in Latvia).
Tselms, a newspaper journalist, first noted that the suspects were physically "coerced"
into giving false confessions to crimes they did not commit. Id. Second, even after the
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The impetus behind these relatively recent accounts of injustice is
Gorbachev's highly touted policy of glasnost, which calls for greater
openness in almost all aspects of Soviet society.5 It is through this pol-
icy of openness that Gorbachev, in 1985, began attempting to further
his call for perestroika, or restructuring, in the Soviet economy.6 By
the end of 1986, however, after his initial attempts at economic restruc-
turing failed, the General Secretary concluded that if he wanted to ex-
pedite economic reform, he would also have to implement significant
political reforms.7 One such political reform that evoked tremendous
attention from the government, the legal community, academia, aver-
age citizens,' and especially the press was the sorely needed reform of
the Soviet criminal justice system."
This comment will examine those areas of the Soviet criminal justice
system which, under glasnost and perestroika, the Soviets have identi-
fied and openly acknowledged as areas desperately needing reform.
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief overview of the basic tenets
suspects recanted their false testimonies, they were sentenced to long periods of incar-
ceration or death by a judicial panel that was determined to convict with or without
evidence. Id. Finally, following the real wrongdoers' admissions of guilt, the court re-
luctantly acknowledged its "error." Id.
5. See Shelley, supra note 3, at 183 (noting that Gorbachev's policy of glasnost has
led many newspapers and legal periodicals to print stinging exposes about the corrup-
tion of the Soviet criminal justice system).
6. See Beissinger, Political Reform and Soviet Society, 87 CURRENT HIST. 317,
317-18 (1988) (noting that although Gorbachev initiated only moderate economic re-
forms in 1985 and 1986, these initial "minor" reforms gained inevitable momentum
and developed into a program of radical reform for almost all facets of Soviet govern-
mental and social structures).
7. See Goldman, Perestroika in the Soviet Union, 87 CURRENT HIsT. 313 (1988)
(explaining that Gorbachev did not begin to stress glasnost until he realized that the
Soviet people would not accept his idea of perestroika without the promise of a new
openness in Soviet society). Gorbachev recognized the Soviet people's disillusionment
with previous unsuccessful calls for economic reform and realized that he had to pro-
pose basic political reforms. Id.; see also Bialer, Gorbachev's Program of Change:
Sources, Significance, Prospects, 103 POL. ScI. Q. 403, 423 (1988) (noting that
Gorbachev's plan for political reform consists of three distinct elements: first, the re-
duction and decentralization of the Soviet bureaucracies; second, the democratization
of Soviet life; and third, the enhancement of the role of law and legality).
8. Bialer, supra note 7, at 426.
9. See New Calls for Reforms in Soviet Courts, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS
No. 20, at 8 (1987) [hereinafter Reforms in Soviet Courts] (pointing out problems
with the system, in particular that official trial records are often changed to "fit" the
verdict, and that judges, who seldom question the "confessions" of the accused, often
"assume" that defendants are guilty); see also Move, Ways of Restructuring The Le-
gal System: Complaint Against A Sentence, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 31,
at 23 (1987) (noting that the current procedure for handling complaints against judi-
cial sentences is defective). The procedure is not regulated by any statute and as a
result the complainant and his defense lawyer are denied the opportunity to meet per-
sonally with the judicial officials investigating and deciding the case. Id.
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of Soviet criminal law and the structure of the criminal justice system
in the Soviet Union. Part II will highlight those areas of the Soviet
criminal justice system that the Soviet legal community, the Soviet
press, and the general public have identified as areas in need of reform.
Part III will discuss the Soviet government's proposals for reform of
the Soviet criminal justice system that were introduced in 1986 through
1988. Part IV will examine those government proposals for legal re-
form that were implemented during the 1986-1988 period. Part V will
identify and examine both the Soviet government's proposals for legal
reform and the legal reforms that were enacted into law from the dawn
of 1989 through the end of January 1990. Finally, the comment will
conclude that, despite potentially overwhelming obstacles, including the
traditional conservative tendencies of Soviet society in the face of pro-
posed change, Gorbachev has succeeded in his desire to enact legal re-
forms that, if stringently obeyed, will drastically alter and improve the
foundations of the Soviet criminal justice system.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
The Western belief in the importance of the "rule of law," a rule
providing that decisions should be made through the application of rec-
ognized principles or laws without injecting discretion into their appli-
cation, 1° is an entirely unacceptable concept within the traditional pa-
rameters of Soviet law."1 The foundation of the Soviet legal and social
structure is based upon sotsialistichegkaya zakonnost or socialist legal-
ity."2 This is a principal through which the Communist Party has tradi-
tionally sought to promote effective enforcement of their policies by us-
10. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1196 (5th ed. 1979).
11. Wasserman, The U.S.S.R. Legal System, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 26, 1981, at 1.
Marxist-Leninist doctrine rejects the idea of a "rule of law" because it believes that
such a rigid notion of the idea of law is simply a means by which a class-oriented
capitalistic society is perpetuated. Id.; F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, G.P. VAN DEN BERG &
W.B. SIMONS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SoviEr LAw 706 (2d rev. ed. 1985) [hereinafter
F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE] (stating that the principle of a "rule of law" is a "meta-legal
principle" that binds legislative power and is intended to curtail administrative power
over citizens).
12. See F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 706 (defining "socialist legality" as
"a strict observance of law by all agencies of the state, social organizations, institu-
tions, government officials, and citizens"); KONST. SSSR, trans. in Legislative Acts of
the U.S.S.R. 1977-79, Book One, at 29 (noting that socialist legality is reflected in
Chapter I of the Soviet Constitution, entitled "Principles of the Social Structure and
Policy of the USSR"). Article 4 of the Constitution states that "[t]he Soviet state and
all its bodies function on the basis of socialist law, ensure the maintenance of law and
order, and safeguard the interests of society and the rights and freedoms of citizens."
Id.
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ing law as a tool for implementing their social policies."3
Under Lenin, the rule of law was formally proclaimed as a funda-
mental principle of the Soviet state.14 By 1925, however, the idea of a
formal rule of law was replaced with notions of expediency and rule by
common sense.' 5 The Leninist rule of law was conveniently ignored
whenever it stood in the way of the will of the Party. 6 It was not until
after Gorbachev's rise to power, however, that the Soviet government
actually acknowledged that a rule of law did not govern their state.
17
A. SOURCES AND FUNDAMENTALS OF SOVIET LAW
Unlike Western criminal law, Soviet criminal law is almost exclu-
sively statutory in nature.18 The Criminal Code of the Russian Repub-
lic' 9 explicitly states that the ultimate goal of Soviet criminal law is the
protection of a prescribed set of specific social, political, and economic
values that will perpetuate a socialist society. 0 It is ironic to note the
inconsistency of this principle when compared with classic Marxist doc-
trine, which holds that law will ultimately become unnecessary and
wither away when a true communist society is attained." Despite the
Marxist belief that society is constantly undergoing social and eco-
13. See F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 706 (stating that Socialist legality
in the Soviet Union, in regard to the idea of a "rule of law," is not intended to limit the
State bureaucracy's power over its citizens).
14. See Feofanov, How Rule of Law has Fared in USSR, 39 CURRENT DIG. SO-
VIET PRESS No. 32, at 7 (1987) (noting that, on the first anniversary of the October
Revolution, a resolution entitled "On Strict Observance of the Laws," which heralded
the importance of the "rule of law" as a fundamental tenet of Soviet society, was
adopted by the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets).
15. See id. at 8 (recounting how A.A. Solts and Nikolai Vasilyevich Krylenko, two
influential Party members, introduced the idea of rebuking any notions of a "rule of
law").
16. See id. (indicating that by the end of the 1920s many Soviet jurists were
alarmed by the Soviet criminal justice system's blatant rejection of the "rule of law").
17. See Gorbachev, Gorbachev Report Sizes Up Restructuring, 40 CURRENT DIG.
SOVIET PRESS No. 26, at 7, 19 (1988) (implying that a tradition of legal conservatism
in the USSR has blocked the growth of a democratic rule of law).
18. Gorle, Criminal Law, in THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF SOVIET LAw 227, 231
(F.J.M. Feldbrugge ed. 1987).
19. Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (UK
RSFSR).
20. Id. art. 1. Article I of the UK RSFSR outlines the purposes of the Code:
"[t]he Criminal Code of the RSFSR shall have as its tasks the protection of the social
system of the USSR, its political and economic systems, socialist ownership, the person
and rights and freedoms of citizens, and the entire socialist legal order against criminal
infringements." Id., trans. in Gorle, supra note 18, at 231.
21. Wasserman, supra note 11, at 1. Marxist doctrine holds that when a true com-
munist state has been created self-discipline and social awareness will make formal law
unnecessary and obsolete. Id.
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nomic transformations, the Soviet Union, over the last seventy years,
has become increasingly dependent on rigid norms that have been codi-
fied into law, suggesting that society is simply a static entity. 22
A close examination of the Soviet Criminal Codes reveals that pro-
tection, not retribution, is the main goal of Soviet criminal law. 3 In the
Soviet Union, the entire socialist legal order, including the private citi-
zen and his legal rights, are the objects of this protection.2' The Soviet
Criminal Codes also highlight the basic premise of Soviet criminal law:
the containment of potentially dangerous social acts. 25
Since the Soviet Union has no common law, - the legislature is the
primary creator of criminal law.27 One important exception to this rule,
however, is that the Plenum, or full bench of the USSR Supreme
Court, has the power to issue guiding explanations that are binding
upon all lower courts and administrative bodies or officials to whom
they might apply.28 These explanations interpret legal rules and outline
the preferred method for analyzing and applying certain criminal legis-
lation in the context of a criminal trial.2"
B. COURT STRUCTURE AND THE TRIAL PROCESS
The court of original jurisdiction in the Soviet Union is the local
people's court. 30 The bench of the people's court is comprised of one
22. See M. Los, COMMUtNISr IDEOLOGY, LAW AND CRIME 57-58 (1988) (noting
that the very rigid codes promulgated in the past few years reject a flexible approach to
the law and seem to resemble the fixed "bourgeois law" that was previously disap-
proved of in the Soviet Union).
23. Gorle, supra note 18, at 232.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note I1, at 217 (explaining that, when de-
ciding whether certain behavior is criminal, the main consideration in the Soviet Union
is to determine whether the behavior constitutes a "social danger").
26. See J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, TIHE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: THE
LAw IN THE 1980's 31 (1984) (contending that, despite Lenin's attempts to free the
Soviet legal system from past influences, the Romanist tradition of denying judges the
power to create law has survived as an element of the Soviet criminal justice system).
27. See id. (observing the Soviet belief that a new social order is created more
expediently when the legislature, rather than the courts, is given the complete responsi-
bility for promulgating the criminal law).
28. Butler, Necessary Defense, Judge-Made Law, and Soviet Man, in LAW AFTER
REVOLUTION 99, 114 (1988). When the legislature is silent on a particular substantive
area of the law, Soviet jurists look to these "guiding explanations" to provide them
with a source of law. Id. at 113-14.
29. See 0. IOFFEE & P. MAGGS, SOVIET LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 58
(1983) [hereinafter 0. IOFFEE] (noting, for example, that where the Soviet Criminal
Code requires more severe punishment for stealing "on an especially large scale" the
USSR Supreme Court decided that the dividing line between ordinary and "large
scale" stealing is 2,500 rubles).
30. See Patterson & Doak, Criminal Justice in Soviet Russia, 4 INT'L J. OF COMP.
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judge-chairman and two people's assessors, all of whom are elected
through general elections.31 People's assessors are laypeople who, theo-
retically, enjoy the privileges of judges and participate fully in the ren-
dering of judgments and in deciding all questions of law before the
court. 2 Despite the official claim that judges and people's assessors
work on an equal plain, most Soviet jurists agree that the role of the
people's assessors is a passive one dominated by the judges. 3 This mix
of judges and people's assessors is also utilized in the Courts of the
Territories and the Supreme Court of the Republic, which comprise the
Courts of Appeal above the people's courts and serve as courts of origi-
nal jurisdiction for major offenses.34 The Supreme Court of the USSR
is the court of final appeal, and is comprised of seventeen judges and
twenty people's assessors.
3 5
Although from a cursory glance the Soviet trial system appears simi-
lar to the United States model, a closer examination uncovers funda-
mental differences.36 The principal difference is that in the United
States criminal trials are intended to serve as a forum for establishing
and corroborating evidence,3 7 whereas Soviet criminal trials simply
serve as a "rubber stamping" review of the evidence and conclusions
drawn during the preliminary investigation. 8 Unlike American courts,
& APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 113, 116 (1980) [hereinafter Patterson] (noting that minor
offenses are heard in people's courts). Ten years is the maximum sentence that a peo-
ple's court can levy, although most sentences involve only a simple public apology or
self denunciation. Id.
31. F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 212. People's assessors are considered
the outstanding representatives of the community. 0. IOFFEE, supra note 29, at 304.
Their presence is to ensure that the defendant is judged by his "peers." Patterson,
supra note 30, at 116.
32. See F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 572 (stating that people's assessors
were originally intended to serve as a populist element in the judicial system, thereby
ensuring that justice was administered by a representative cross-section of the society);
see also M. Los, supra note 22, at 60 (noting that people's assessors are not expected
to possess any knowledge of the law). People's assessors continue to work full-time in
their regular jobs while serving on the court. Id. But see Patterson, supra note 30, at 16
(finding that because law assessor's do not have a formal legal education they are often
intimidated by judges and the entire judicial process).
33. See 0. IOFFEE, supra note 29, at 304 (suggesting one factor that contributes to
the dominant role of the judge is that, unlike a jury, which deliberates in seclusion, the
people's assessors deliberate with the judge).
34. Patterson, supra note 30, at 116.
35. Id.
36. See Wrobel, supra note 1, at 169 (assessing the extent to which the Soviet trial
system differs from the American and European systems).
37. See J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, EVIDENCE 12 (1987) (noting that exhibits are not
offered as evidence until the trial, at which time the court will either receive or reject
the exhibit as official evidence).
38. Id. Traditionally, trials in the Soviet Union have never served as forums for the
inaugural presentation of evidence. Id.
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whose primary concern is the determination of innocence or guilt, the
primary concern of Soviet courts has been the promotion of a national
spirit of socialism and communism.3 9 Another difference is that in con-
trast to the United States' adversarial model, the Soviet court system
follows the European inquisitorial model;40 Soviet judges actively par-




The most determinative period in the Soviet prosecution process is
the pretrial period,42 during which an investigation is conducted by an
impartial investigator and supervised by a state prosecutor, both mem-
bers of the Procuracy, an agency somewhat analogous to the United
States Justice Department.43 In this pretrial process, the investigator,
rather than working independently under the auspices of the court,
works under the direction of the Procuracy." This feature of Soviet
criminal procedure departs radically from Western European inquisito-
rial systems, where an independent judge oversees the preliminary in-
vestigation. 5 The Soviet Procuracy's simultaneous prosecutorial and
supervisory functions cast serious doubt on their legitimate
39. See Patterson, supra note 30, at 117 (quoting chapter 1, article 3 of the Funda-
mental Principles of Criminal Legislation, adopted in 1960, which state that the func-
tion of the Soviet court system is "[t]o educate citizens in the spirit of loyalty to the
motherland and to the cause of and in the spirit of strict and undeviating execution of
Soviet laws, of attitude of care toward socialist ownership."); see also Gorle, supra note
18, at 265 (theorizing that criminal law is used by the Party as an instrument for
directing and controlling social change).
40. See Gorle, supra note 18, at 261 (noting that the inquisitorial model introduced
in Russia in 1716 by Peter the Great originated in Medieval ecclesiastical courts); see
also Patterson, supra note 30, at 117 (suggesting that theoretically, in an inquisitorial
model, the court, the prosecution, and the defense all work toward the common goal of
uncovering the truth).
41. Patterson, supra note 30, at 117; see F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 1I, at
222 (stating that during this preliminary inquiry, the court, the Procuracy, and the
investigator all evaluate the evidence on the basis of their internal convictions and on
socialist legal doctrine).
42. Feofanov, Illegalities in Preliminary Investigations, 39 CURRENTr DIG. SOVIET
PRESS No. 22, at 8 (1987).
43. Cf. Patterson, supra note 30, at 117-19 (noting that the investigator's and state
prosecutor's findings during the "investigation" are inaccessible to the defense counsel
until after the completion of the investigation).
44. See F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 600 (noting that in pre-revolution-
ary Russia and the early years of the Soviet Republic, the court followed the French
and German models of preliminary investigation by placing the investigators under the
auspices of the court). In addition to serving as the prosecutorial agency, the Procuracy
also serves as the "impartial guardian of legality" during the preliminary investigation.
Id. at 601; Gorle, supra note 18, at 262 (observing that in addition to supervising the
investigation, the procurator may choose to conduct the investigation personally).
45. Gorle, supra note 18, at 262. In comparison, the "investigation judge" in
Belgium is legitimately independent, not subject to pressure from the procurer, and not
a participant in trying cases in which he or she served as an investigator. Id. at 262.
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impartiality. 6
The defense counsel's inability to enter into the case on behalf of the
suspect until after the completion of the entire pretrial investigation
further compounds the procurator's dubious role in the investigation.'
7
Suspects usually remain totally unaware of their legal rights during the
pretrial period. 8 In addition, the government may legally hold suspects
for a substantial pretrial detention period without court approval and
without offering release upon the posting of bail. 9
Sentencing options available to Soviet Courts include public censure
or apology, confiscation of property, removal of title or rank, correc-
tional labor, ineligibility to hold a public office, and exile or banishment
from a certain region of the country. ° In the case of incarceration, the
court is limited to imposing a fifteen year maximum prison sentence.5 1
Imprisonment for life is not an option in the Soviet Union. 2 The court
may, however, impose the death penalty for an extremely wide spec-
trum of crimes ranging from treason and aggravated homicide to theft
of state property and currency speculation. 3 Finally, it is important to
note that the Soviet courts do not follow the presumption of innocence
doctrine during the criminal trial process.54 Although the Soviet Su-
46. F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 601; see Gorle, supra note 18, at 262
(determining that Soviet criminal procedure fails to meet the fair trial and due process
standards promulgated by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
47. 0. IOFFEE, supra note 29, at 290; KONST. SSSR, art. 158, trans. in Legislative
Acts of the USSR 1977-79, Book One, at 68. Although a criminal defendant in the
USSR has a constitutional right to legal aid, the constitution does not specify at what
point in the trial process this right attaches to the defendant. Id.
48. See Wasserman, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that a suspect's lack of counsel
means that the suspect is never informed of his right to refuse to testify during the
investigation and that the suspect is never warned that any statement he makes can be
used against him during the trial).
49. See id. (noting that the investigator on his own accord can detain a subject for
as long as three days).
50. Patterson, supra note 30, at 120. Despite the broad range of sentencing options,
since 1960, a trend of constraining the courts' discretionary powers while enhancing the
severity of punishments has emerged. F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 695.
51. Patterson, supra note 30, at 120. Courts impose this maximum term only when
the defendant has committed a serious crime or has a high recidivism rate. Id.
52. Prison Conditions, Practices Questioned, 41 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PREss No.
35, at 11 (1989) [hereinafter Prison Conditions].
53. Id.; see F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 96 (noting that under the 1960-
1961 Criminal Codes the number of different types of capital punishment offenses was
greatly expanded). The codes, however, asserted that capital punishment was only a
temporary measure. Id.
54. See Gorle, supra note 18, at 263 (noting that despite the Soviet Union's ratifi-
cation of the International Covenant of Human Rights, adopting the "presumption of
innocence," the Soviet Constitution of 1977 makes no reference whatsoever to such a
belief); see also Fletcher, The Presumption of Innocence in the Soviet Union, 15
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preme Court recognized this doctrine in 1978 through an official de-
cree,55 Soviet courts have not implemented it. 6
II. PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND A CALL FOR REFORM IN THE GORBACHEV
ERA
A. PARTY INFLUENCES IN THE SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
One of the oldest and most controversial aspects of legal reform in
the Soviet Union is the unofficial, but extremely powerful role that the
Communist Party plays in the administration of criminal law and jus-
tice. 7 The Soviet press has rendered many vivid accounts of how both
high and low level Party members routinely intervene in the judicial
process.58 The Party applies political pressure so that judges and peo-
ple's assessors rule in favor of Party members, insulating members,
their relatives, and their Party perks from the reach of the law."9 This
system of legal favoritism, known as telephone law,6 0 places the inde-
UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1222 (1968) (stating that Soviet scholars' traditional avoidance
of an open, public discussion of the presumption of innocence doctrine was simply a
shield for the significant institutional struggle in Soviet law over the importance of this
doctrine).
55. Gorle, supra note 18, at 263-64.
56. See Chaikovskaya & Anashkin, Morality and the Lam." Slander? I Don't Be-
lieve It!, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 20, at 9 (1987) [hereinafter Chaikov-
skaya] (noting the "legal-proceedings nihilism" pervading the minds of jurists, law stu-
dents, and the mass of society supports the more repressive and punitive aspect of the
law rather than the legal guarantees it is supposed to provide).
57. See Shelley, supra note 3, at 197-98 (explaining that articles in the Soviet press
on legal reform focus on the strong, established relationship between members of the
judiciary and influential members of the Communist Party-a relationship strong
enough to thwart investigations on a national level); see also Petrukhin, Justice and
Legality, Soy. L. & GOV'T, 1988-89, at 19-20 (noting that the Soviet government has
acknowledged the existence of Party interference in the Soviet criminal justice system
and has officially resolved to abolish such Party interference). Despite the Soviet gov-
ernment's recognition of Party interference in the judicial process, the government has
been unable to eliminate this problem. Id.
58. See Shelley, supra note 3, at 197 (describing newspaper article titles that are
highly critical of the procurators' subordination to the Party's desires).
59. See Sharlet, Politics of Soviet Law, PROBS. oF COMu1uIs.I, 54, 56-57 (Jan.-
Feb. 1986) (providing examples of how Nikolay A. Shchelokov, Leonid Brezhnev's
Minister of Internal Affairs, received only Party sanctions and was not subjected to
criminal prosecution for his involvement in a bribery scandal, and how a prominent
Leningrad law professor used his Party connections to have attempted rape charges
dropped against his son); see also Shelley, supra note 3, at 197 (noting how one procu-
rator's attempt to prosecute an illegal and inequitable housing distribution was termi-
nated by Party officials when they learned that a government official's daughter had
benefitted from the scam).
60. See Courts Ordered to stop Abusing the Law, 38 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS
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pendence of the judiciary in jeopardy by subordinating the judiciary to
the whims of the Party.61 To the alarm of Soviet jurists, the use and
power of telephone law has grown considerably in the last fifteen
years.62
Party interference has contributed to the drastic decrease in the
number of acquittals granted by Soviet courts over the last twenty-five
years.6 3 Many Soviet jurists suggest that acquittal has disappeared al-
together."4 The low acquittal level is partially attributed to Party chief-
tains who instruct judges to avoid giving acquittals, thus bolstering the
image of district officials as successful law enforcers.6 5 This judicial ac-
quiescence to Party officials' demands results from the judiciary's de-
pendence on local authorities for their living allowances and for the
needed political support for re-election and promotion. 6 In addition, a
judge could incur Party sanctions for refusing to follow local Party
criminal policy.
6 7
Proponents of legal reform advocate reforms that would free all
members of the judiciary from the powerful grip of the Party, and cre-
ate independent courts.68 To create this independence, some Soviet ju-
No. 50, at 1, 5 (1987) [hereinafter Courts Ordered] (noting that technology has trans-
formed "telephone law" into "intercom law" and might soon create "computer law").
61. See id. (noting that direct phone lines often ran between a judge's chambers
and the district headquarters for purposes of "consultation"). This subordination of the
judiciary to the Party is blatant and openly acknowledged by Party members. Sharlet,
supra note 59, at 56. This fact was evidenced by the remark of one Party official, who
said to a crowd of Soviet judges, "Yes, you judges are independent and subordinate
only to law. But you are dependent on me, are you not?" Id. at 56.
62. See Courts Ordered, supra note 60, at 5 (noting that while in the 1970s only
ten percent of Soviet judges acknowledged pressure from "outside sources," this per-
centage increased by over one hundred and fifty percent in the 1980s); see also Judi-
cial Reforms, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that telephone calls from influential people or"old friends" often carry more weight than the written law).
63. See Petrukhin, supra note 57, at 28 (stating that the decline in acquittals is
due to the poor quality of pretrial investigations). The acquittal rate in the Soviet
Union fell from ten percent prior to the 1960s to 0.3% in the late 1980s. Id.
64. Courts Ordered, supra note 60, at 5. Despite the significant amount of atten-
tion that the lack of acquittals has received in the press, these writings have not gener-
ated any reform action on the part of the Government. Id.
65. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 84 (noting that Party leaders expect judges to
cooperate with their occasional requests because acquittals, seen as failures, shed a
negative light upon local Party officials and open the way for unwanted intervention by
higher Party officials); Shelley, supra note 3, at 202 (noting that innocent citizens are
convicted because the Party desires to secure convictions for reported crimes and Party
sponsored prosecutions).
66. Petrukhin, supra note 57, at 21.
67. Id.
68. See Shelley, supra note 3, at 197 (stating that legal reformists urge profes-
sional judges not to subordinate their authority to the desires of local Party officials,
including demands made over the phone); Savitsky, Selecting Judges, 40 CURRENT
DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 20, at 23 (1988) (stating that a blend of "political, legal, orga-
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rists recommend taking the power to appoint judges away from the lo-
cal district level Soviets and placing the power in the hands of higher
legislative bodies.69 Other Soviet jurists suggest lengthening the terms
that judges serve to life terms."° Another proposal would limit the
Party's power to recall judges.71
Judges perpetuate the illegal influence syndrome by exerting ex-
tremely noticeable, illegal demands on people's assessors. 2 Many
judges in the Russian Republic, for example, have simply abandoned
article 30 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, 3 which requires
judges to consult with people's assessors before rendering a verdict.
7 4
Although people's assessors are intended to represent the average citi-
zen's voice in the judicial process,7 5 their presence is often a meaning-
less formality.
76
When people's assessors attempt to exercise their legitimate judicial
powers of objection, the professional judges usually rebuke them. 77
Court officials often tell people's assessors that they should not question
nizational and material measures" is needed to alleviate the intolerable political pres-
sure felt by courts today).
69. See Petrukhin, supra note 57, at 21 (recommending that the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet select all Soviet judges since decisions made by various Republic courts
are handed down under the name of the Presidium).
70. See Savitsky, supra note 68, at 24 (suggesting that upon recommendation of
the Soviet Minister of Justice the Presidium would appoint judges for life terms, thus
terminating judges' dependence on the local Party members for their political and eco-
nomic survival; Petrukhin, supra note 57, at 22 (suggesting the election of judges for
either ten year terms or for life).
71. See Petrukhin, supra note 57, at 22 (proposing Party procedures that would re-
examine judicial proceedings only when judges are charged with judicial misconduct,
not with irritating local Party officials).
72. See id. (noting that since assessors are called to duty in the order desired by the
judge, the judge can summon only those assessors whom he believes will accept his
decision on any verdict).
73. UK RSFSR, art. 30.
74. See id. (noting that the Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure requires subjecting
all judgments to a vote). Soviet judges' severe lack of deference to people's assessors
has led to the almost complete disappearance of the dissenting opinion as a tool for
shaping the law. Id.
75. See F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 572 (noting that people's assessors
are intended to fulfill the Marxist belief in informal, lay tribunals that include a strong
populist influence).
76. See Judicial Reforns, supra note 3, at 4 (stating that the participation of peo-
ple's assessors in the judicial process is a relatively meaningless act because there are
too few of them on each panel, usually only two); see also F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra
note 11, at 574 (stating that assessors lack tangible power because they work as ama-
teurs on a part-time basis alongside professional legal jurists who tend to intimidate
them).
77. See Shelley, supra note 3, at 201 (retelling the story of how when one people's
assessor participated actively in the courtroom the supervising judge said "send another
people's assessor, such ones are not necessary").
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a judge's professional judgement, but instead, simply support his deci-
sion. 8 Beginning in late 1986, the USSR Supreme Court, in plenary
sessions, called for the enhancement of the people's assessors' role in
the judicial process in an attempt to strengthen the principle of legality
in the Soviet criminal justice system. 9 The court stated that the failure
to allow people's assessors to exercise their full rights as arbiters of the
law was a fundamental violation and could serve as a valid justification
for the reversal of a judgment.8"
Despite the realization that people's assessors' roles are rarely conse-
quential, legal scholars, as early as 1986, suggested increasing the
number of people's assessors on each bench.8 Those who argue for ex-
panding the number of people's assessors' claim that this change would
further Gorbachev's goal of enhancing legality and democratization in
the Soviet Union.82 The minority view, however, maintains that peo-
ple's assessors are untrained and unqualified laypeople who should not
retain the authority to decide the fate of their fellow citizens. 83 The
minority's proposals for reform would completely remove the people's
assessors from the Soviet bench.84
B. DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
STATUS OF THE SOVIET BENCH
Despite disagreement over the roles that judges and people's asses-
78. See id. (citing an example of how one people's assessor, who protested the
harsh punishment levied against the defendant, was told that she should not vote to
acquit the defendant because that would subject the defendant to extended confinement
while a re-trial took place).
79. Courts Ordered, supra note 60, at 1. Under this possibility, judges should not
underestimate the defense's role. The idea that judges should never place restrictions
upon the rights of people's assessors was emphasized by the USSR Supreme Court. ld;
Plenary Session of the USSR Supreme Court, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No.
15, at 17 (1987) [hereinafter Plenary Session].
80. See Plenary Session, supra note 79, at 18 (1987) (noting the USSR Supreme
Court's order that judges who attempt to prevent people's assessors from exercising
their judicial power should face the possibility of penalization).
81. See Judicial Reforms, supra note 3, at 5 (suggesting the formation of a court
of people's assessors with the responsibilities of the Chief Judge reduced to providing
the people's assessors with only a legal form and basis for their verdict).
82. See Reforms in Soviet Courts, supra note 9, at 8 (claiming that a bench com-
prised of people's assessors is fairer and more humane in regard to sentencing than a
bench of professional judges). People's assessors are more democratic because they do
not give into the pressures of telephone law. Id.
83. See Tiuodar, The Legal System-Paths of Restructuring: Who Should Be A
Judge, 39 CURRENT DIG. SovIr PRESS No. 23, at 19 (1987) (noting that for the
purposes of passing legal judgement, assessors as legal amateurs are elevated to the
rank of legal professional).
84. See id. (maintaining that people who do not have the appropriate professional
training cannot master today's complex web of legal intricacies).
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sors should play, a strong consensus supports the idea of drastically
increasing the prestige and status awarded to judges." Over the last
few years, Soviet judges have suffered from too much work88 and too
little pay.8 7 In an effort to expedite the excessive amount of work on
their crowded dockets, judges often reduce the defense lawyer's and the
witnesses' time in court. 8 A devastating result of the low pay is that
the Soviet bench is rapidly losing many of its most mature and exper-
ienced members.8 9
Because of this mass exodus from the bench, the average age of a
Soviet judge is now alarmingly low.9 0 In the Soviet Union, a person can
become a member of the bench at age twenty-five."' To counter this
trend, some legal reformists have suggested a minimum age limit of
thirty years for anyone who desires to serve as a people's judge and a
limit of forty years for anyone wishing to serve on a superior courtY2
Legal reformists have also attacked the low level of prerequisites re-
85. See Cheremnykh, On the Prestige of the Judicial System in a State Governed
by the Rule of Law, 41 CURRENT DIG. SovIEr PREss No. 15, at 24 (1989) (noting that
the material well-being of the judicial system has deteriorated below any acceptable
level and that this chronic problem must end before any other judicial reform can
proceed).
86. Reforms in Soviet Courts, supra note 9, at 8. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many, while having less than one-quarter of the population of the Soviet Union, has the
same number of judges. Id. This helps to explain why Soviet judges are overburdened
and overtired. Id.; see Cheremnykh, supra note 85, at 25 (noting that one out of every
five judges is relieved of his/her duties because of nervous disorders).
87. See Cheremnykh, supra note 85, at 24 (noting that the humiliating salaries of
judges not only inhibit the judicial profession and the Soviet courts from achieving any
semblance of prestige, but threaten the very existence of the current judicial system);
see also id. at 25 (noting that the average pay in the USSR is two hundred and seven-
teen rubles a month, while the average pay in the Ministry of Justice is only one hun-
dred and thirty seven rubles). Over 3,000 judges in the Russian Republic alone do not
have a permanent residence and are homeless. Id.
88. Reforms in Soviet Courts, supra note 9, at 8. This reduction of time is
achieved by rushing the arguments of lawyers and by cutting off the testimony of wit-
nesses. Id.
89. See Cheremnykh, supra note 85, at 24 (noting that because the quality of the
judicial corps has deteriorated so rapidly, the turnover rate of people's judges in recent
years has exceeded fifty percent). Twenty percent of the judges in Russia, thirty-three
percent of judges in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kirgizia, Latvia and Estonia, and every
last judge in Moldavia refuse to serve another term if their salaries are not drastically
increased. Id.
90. See id. (noting that since the majority of the Soviet bench is extremely young,
the bench has not mastered the law or acquired the wisdom and restraint that only
comes with age).
91. Savitsky, supra note 68, at 23.
92. Id. V. Savitsky, director of the Department of Legality at the Soviet Academy
of Sciences Institute of State and Law, stated that a man or woman of twenty-five
years of age does not possess the wisdom or the experience necessary to be able to
decide the fate of others. Id.
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quired to serve on the Soviet bench. 93 Some members of the Soviet le-
gal community believe a more intense and specialized education should
stand as a requirement for those people wishing to serve on the bench."'
Other members of the Soviet legal community have suggested that po-
tential judges should also have some practical experience in the admin-
istration of justice.95 Finally, some critics believe that all prospective
members of the bench should be required to pass a state examination in
order to join the bench.96
C. THE ROLE OF THE PROCURACY IN THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
The most alarming aspect of the Procuracy's role in the pretrial in-
vestigation is that even though the Procuracy is the agency responsible
for directing the investigation, the Procuracy also has the responsibility
to oversee the investigation to prevent the commission of illegalities.
9 7
Thus, the Procuracy is in the advantageous position of reporting to no
institution other than itself.98 Soviet newspapers frequently publish
highly critical accounts of the Procuracy's flagrant violations of social-
ist legality during the preliminary investigation. 9 The USSR Supreme
93. See Tiuodar, supra note 83, at 19 (noting that the only prerequisite a person
needs to become a judge is a law school diploma); see also Quigley, Soviet Courts
Undergoing Major Reforms, 22 INT'L LAW. 459, 465 (1988) (complaining that people
can obtain law degrees through correspondence schools).
94. See Tiuodar, supra note 83, at 19 (implying that a law school degree is not a
sufficient prerequisite for a judgeship and claiming that, beginning in their schools of
higher learning, jurists should study with the goal of becoming a judge as their area of
specialization).
95. See Savitsky, supra note 68, at 23 (suggesting that aspiring judges should
spend at least three years working as an investigator, a defense attorney, or other simi-
lar legal specialist).
96. Id. Some jurists believe that potential judges should be tested for "maturity in
life, moral irreproachability and . . . skill at accurately investigating' the extremely
complex legal situations that constitute the judge's daily work." Id.
97. See Petrukhin, supra note 57, at 20 (noting that the Procuracy's dual role in
the pretrial period strips them of all objectivity and creates an accusatory bias towards
prosecution); Vaksberg, The Queen of Evidence, in Soy. LAW & GOV'T 6, at 15 (Win-
ter 1988-1989) (noting that neither justice nor legality will prevail as long as the bias
toward prosecution exists); Reforms in Soviet Courts, supra note 9, at 10 (stating that
because of this dual role, the prosecutor is put in the extremely advantageous position
of supervising himself).
98. Reforms in Soviet Courts, supra note 9, at 10.
99. Illegalities in Preliminary Investigation, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PREss no.
22, at 8 (1987) [hereinafter Illegalities]; see Gdlyan, Ivanov: Investigators Run
Amok?, 41 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 20, at 9-14 (1989) [hereinafter Investi-
gators] (observing that, in May 1989, Soviet newspapers were filled with detailed ac-
counts of a plethora of illegalities conducted by T. Kh. Gdlyan and N. V. Ivanov, two
investigators in the USSR Prosecutor's Office, during numerous pretrial investigations).
In an attempt to cause suspects to suffer psychological breakdowns, the prosecutors
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Court has acknowledged that various local prosecutor's offices have lev-
eled criminal charges against innocent people and convicted them with-
out reliable evidence.
1 00
The first injustice encountered by many criminal suspects in the So-
viet criminal justice system is pretrial detention. 101 Immediately follow-
ing an arrest, the Procuracy may detain suspects for many months
without any justification other than the assertion of a need to question
the suspect.'10 Imposition of this lengthy pretrial detention without a
trial 10 3 or the right to challenge the detention'" compounds the
injustice.
Besides criticizing the detention itself, some Soviet jurists have also
protested against the harsh, prison-like conditions imposed on detainees
in the temporary confinement facilities.105 The severe deprivation of
both human and legal rights to detained suspects, some of whom are
perpetrated various illegalities such as bribing witnesses, coercing witnesses and sus-
pects to make false confessions or testimony, making warrantless arrests, fabricating
evidence, and keeping suspects in prison-like detention for years without a trial or any
justification. Id.
100. Special Resolution of the Plenary Session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court.
Apr. 25, 1989, 41 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 18, at 24 (1989) [hereinafter
Special Resolution]; Berkhin, In The U.S.S.R. Prosecutor's Office, 39 CURRENT DIG.
SoviET PRESS No. 48, at 29 (1988) (discussing the case of V.B. Berkhin, a journalist,
in which the Procuracy initiated proceedings against Berkhin for malicious hooliganism
without any evidentiary basis to support their accusations). Even after these violations
were exposed, the guilty members of the Procuracy were never called to account for
their actions. Id.
101. See Illegalities, supra note 99, at 9 (noting that the law permits an initial
detention period of up to 72 hours).
102. See 0. IOFFEE, supra note 29, at 292 (commenting on the possibility of a
suspect's "incommunicado" detainment for several months); see also FELDBRUGGE,
supra note 11, at 222 (noting that if a suspect is detained for two months during the
preliminary investigation, appropriate approval from Procuracy officials at various
levels may lead to extension of the detention period to three, six, and ultimately to nine
months); Quigley, supra note 93, at 463 (noting that the average period of pretrial
detention is four to five months, although it often lasts as long as nine months).
103. Glasnost and Perestroika are Changing Soviet Law, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 21,
1988, at 4 [hereinafter Glasnost and Perestroika].
104. See Quigley, supra note 93, at 463 (noting that detainees have no right to
request a court to review the legality of their detention). Although Soviet courts have
the power to release suspects held in pretrial custody, they rarely exercise this power.
Id.; see also After An Anonymous Letter, 38 CURRENT DiG. SOVIET PRESS No. 24, at
23 (1986) [hereinafter Anonymous Letter] (implying that pretrial custody as practiced
in the Soviet Union is paramount to a criminal act).
105. See A Suspect Is Not Yet A Criminal, 40 CURRENT DIG. SovIET PRESS No.
42, at 18 (1988) [hereinafter A Suspect Is Not Yet A Criminal] (stating that detained
suspects are not given bed linen, and are forced to sleep on bare platforms with the
other detainees); see also Prison Conditions, supra note 52, at II & 28 (noting that
the atrocious living conditions in the detention centers, where there may be up to 40
people in one cell). Convicted felons in the USSR are given better living conditions
than people held in pretrial custody. A Suspect Is Not Yet A Criminal, supra note 105.
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innocent, has caused some detainees to suffer mental breakdowns and
commit suicide. 10 6 Critics of this system claim that the root of the
problem stems from the popular belief that detention is synonymous
with criminal guilt.10 7 In an attempt to remedy this situation, some So-
viet jurists have proposed that the court decide the length of detain-
ment of a suspect on an individual basis, 08 circumventing automatic
approval for detention by the procurator. 0 9 Other Soviet jurists, how-
ever, including the former Chief Judge of the USSR Supreme Court,
believe that courts should make no decisions regarding pretrial deten-
tion.1'0 These jurists, including some members of the Procuracy, have
protested that without the power of detention the ability to enforce the
law is severely limited."'
Another common injustice encountered during the pretrial investiga-
tion is that innocent suspects will often confess to crimes that they did
not commit because of the extreme mental and/or physical coercion
applied to them by the investigator. 1 2 The impetus behind this illegal-
106. A Suspect Is Not Yet A Criminal, supra note 105. Detainees are deprived, for
example, of the right to possess money, the right to take walks, and the right to read
magazines or books. Id.; see Prison Conditions, supra note 52, at 28 (noting that is is
not unusual for people in detention centers to disintegrate completely and commit
suicide).
107. See id. (stating that the "Statute on Procedures for the Detention of Persons
Suspected of Committing Crimes," which was promulgated in the 1970s, legalized the
harsh treatment that is applied to citizens in pretrial custody).
108. Terebilov Backs Some Judicial Reforms, 38 CURRENT DIG. SOvIET PRESS
No. 43, at 5 (1986) [hereinafter Terebilov]. Some Soviet lawyers have called for a
court procedure that would allow a person subject to arrest to challenge their arrest.
Id.; Quigley, supra note 93, at 463. Other Soviet lawyers have suggested that arrested
suspects deserve a right to prompt judicial arraignment. Id.
109. See Glasnost and Perestroika, supra note 103, at 4 (suggesting that the
courts, and not the Procuracy, should decide if there is sufficient justification to detain
a suspect).
110. Terebilov, supra note 108, at 5. Terebilov believes that courts should not suf-
fer the burdens of pretrial detention matters because at such an early stage of the
investigation the courts do not have a sufficient amount of information on which to base
any ruling regarding detention. Id. In addition, Terebilov believes that if a judge were
to make a determination about the release of the detainee, he would infer his belief as
to the guilt or innocence of the suspect and would thereby jeopardize the "fairness" of
the trial. Id.
111. See Don't Take Away Themis's Sword, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No.
51, at 21 (1988) [hereinafter Themis's Sword] (stating that in order to uncover the
truth, the investigator must isolate or detain subjects to prevent them from conspiring
on a lie). Without this power of detention, claim some investigators, the criminal re-
leased before trial just "laughs in your face" and possibly escapes criminal prosecution.
Id.
112. See Courts Ordered, supra note 60, at 4 (stating that in one case, confessions
were literally beaten out of fourteen people who were later found innocent); see also
Tselms, supra note 4, at 5 (noting how physical coercion was used to obtain a false,
forced confession); Anonymous Letter, supra note 104, at 23 (claiming how one witness
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ity is the formidable pressure placed on investigators to solve all their
cases at any price.113 The injustice of the confession is magnified when
a defendant repudiates his confession in court and the trial judge ref-
uses to accept the repudiation."1  Judges will often blindly accept the
tape recorded confession of a defendant made during the preliminary
investigation and reject the courtroom repudiation of illegally procured
testimony. 1 5 Legal scholars argue that confessions cannot form the ba-
sis on which a verdict rests without the support of other credible
evidence." 6
The situation above underscores what many legal reformists see as a
fundamental error in the Soviet criminal justice system: the judiciary's
lack of adherence to the principle of a presumption of innocence."
7
Proponents of legal reform, led by members of academia, have repeat-
edly called for the official establishment of a presumption of inno-
cence.11 8 They realize, however, that traditional Soviet doctrine rejects
this principle.1 9 In fact, supporters of legal reform complain that many
was illegally coerced into giving testimony by an investigator threatening detention).
113. See Courts Ordered, supra note 60, at 4 (acknowledging how the people in
charge of the case were issued a warning: "[s]olve the case, or else").
114. Reforms in Soviet Courts, supra note 9, at 8. Although the suspect had re-
tracted his confession, the court, on very dubious grounds, still found the defendant
guilty of murder and sentenced him to 15 years in jail. Tselms, supra note 4, at 5. Even
after the defendants had explained that they were forced to slander themselves, one of
the people's assessors simply rejected their statements and said, "[b]ut ... who will
confess to a crime if he isn't beaten?" Courts Ordered, supra note 60, at 4.
115. See Petrukhin, supra note 57, at 27-28 (noting that judges are too quick to
dismiss allegations that a tape-recorded confession was procured by illegal means with-
out sufficiently verifying the allegations). If the investigator had a legitimately solid
case, he would not attempt to obtain a recording of the accused's confession. Id. Re-
cordings of confessions, whether audio or visual, can prove that a confession was pro-
cured, but cannot prove that the confession was legally obtained Id. (emphasis added).
116. Reforms in Soviet Courts, supra note 9, at 8. Petrukhin, a Doctor of Jurispru-
dence, relies on article 77 of the Russian Republic Code of Criminal Procedure. UK
RSFSR, art. 77.
117. See id. (stating that the lack of adherence to the belief in a "presumption of
innocence" is one of the main reasons for the extremely low acquittal rate in the Soviet
Union); see also Chaikovskaya, supra note 56, at 9 (noting that the principle of a
"presumption of innocence" "fits with difficulty even into the minds of jurists; some
officials talk about it through clenched teeth, and others seem to acknowledge it while
their actions make clear that they deny it in practice").
118. See Chaikovskaya, supra note 56, at 9 (proposing the suggestion of G.
Anashkin, Doctor of Jurisprudence, of incorporating the principle of a "presumption of
innocence" into the new procedural legislation that is currently in the drafting stages);
see also Butler, Legal Reform in the Soviet Union, 1 Te HARRIMAN INsr. F. 1, 4
(Sept. 1988) (stating that the authors of the Theoretical Model Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, completed in the spring of 1988, "strongly recommended" the incorporation of
the term "presumption of innocence" in that doctrine).
119. Chaikovakaya, supra note 56, at 9. In a study they were conducting, Profes-
sors A. R. Ratinov and G. Kh. Yefremova asked the question, "[wihat ... would be
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members of the Soviet bench adhere to the policy of presumption of
guilt, the ultimate expression of accusatory bias. 2 '
III. GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS FOR LEGAL REFORM
UNDER GORBACHEV, 1986-1988
The first official government references to legal reform under the pol-
icies of glasnost and perestroika originated from Gorbachev in his Po-
litical Report to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the So-
viet Union (CPSU) in February 1986 .21 Gorbachev called for a
general strengthening of socialist legality through the promotion of de-
mocracy 2 and the rule of law. 123 The only specific reform that the
General Secretary proposed at that time, however, was to enhance the
prosecutors' supervisory role over the prosecution process. 2 By the au-
tumn of 1986, the Soviet government was discussing how to improve
Soviet jurisprudence and create a society in which all people would un-
derstand the laws under which they live.'
25
Liberated by Gorbachev's broad and vague statements regarding le-
gal reform, the major Soviet newspapers began printing in late 1986 a
series of scathing articles that uncovered major pockets of corruption
within the Soviet criminal justice system. 20 In response to these harsh
the just thing to do, to convict or to acquit a defendant if the court has doubts about
his guilt but it is impossible to obtain additional . . . evidence?" Id. More than two-
thirds of the survey participants did not know what they would do, and one in seven
said that they would convict in that case. Id.
120. See Courts Ordered, supra note 60, at 4 (noting that courts often begin a case
relying on a presumption of the defendant's guilt); see also Reforms in Soviet Courts,
supra note 9, at 8 (citing a survey of 736 people's judges, in which 43 % said that
before the trial even begins they form an opinion that the defendant is guilty).
121. The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: The Politi-
cal Report of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Soviet
Union-Delivered by Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the C.P.S.U.
Central Committee, on Feb. 25, 1986, 38 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 8, at 4
(1986) [hereinafter Political Report].
122. Id. at 26. Although Gorbachev claimed that a great amount of legal reform
had already taken place, he stressed adherence to the norms of Soviet law because
legality was a vital part of Soviet democracy. Id.
123. See Butler, supra note 118, at 1 (noting Gorbachev's call for a "reliance upon
law" throughout the Soviet Union); see also Political Report, supra note 121, at 26
(stressing that the interests of the state and the interests of citizens, which include
democratic tenets of justice and citizens' equality before the law, demand protection).
124. Political Report, supra note 121, at 26.
125. See The Party Consults With the People-M.S. Gorbachev Meets With the
Working People of Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, 38 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET
PRESS No. 38, at 3 (1986) (suggesting improvement of lawyers' training and the imple-
mentation of a program of elementary legal education for working people).
126. See Shelley, supra note 3, at 196 (noting that in September 1986, Liter-
aturnaya Gazeta published a detailed, blistering expose written by the chief of the
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attacks, various branches of the Soviet government proposed more spe-
cific and- targeted judicial reforms.1 27 The Chairman of the USSR Su-
preme Court, for example, suggested removing the investigative arm of
the judicial process from the auspices of the Procuracy and placing it in
a neutral, separate department, such as the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs.12 s Despite opposition, the Chairman also proposed permitting a
single judge to hear all minor criminal cases (approximately one-third
of the total) without the assistance of people's assessors129 and granting
defense lawyers a slightly greater participatory role in the pretrial
investigation. 130
In November 1986, the CPSU Central Committee responded with a
resolution suggesting that many of the problems in the criminal justice
system would be eradicated if state agencies and officials would not
deviate so seriously from legal norms already established under statu-
tory law.' 3' The resolution strongly urged support for a "strict obser-
criminal law theory division of the Institute of State and Law that led to an onslaught
of articles that revealed a corrupt criminal justice system). Since then, articles discuss-
ing the fundamental deficiencies of the Soviet criminal justice system have regularly
appeared and called for a drastic overhaul of the system. Id.
127. See Legal Dialogues: Justice and the Times, 38 CURRENT DIa. SOVIET PRESS
No. 43, at 5 (1986) [hereinafter Justice and the Times] (discussing the opinions of V.
Terebilov, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, on the exposure of wide-spread
illegalities in Soviet law enforcement and judicial agencies and what effect the climate
of openness and the official policy of restructuring has had on the Soviet criminal jus-
tice system); see also In the C.P.S.U. Central Committee-On Further Strengthening
Socialist Legality and Law and Order and Increasing the Protection of Citizens'
Rights and Legitimate Interests, 38 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 48, at 8 (1986)
[hereinafter Strengthening Socialist Legality] (noting that the C.P.S.U. Central Com-
mittee passed a resolution stating the 27th Party Congress' Policy of bringing democ-
racy into all aspects of Soviet society cannot be separated from the goals of promoting
socialist legality, the constitutional rights of Soviet citizens, and strict adherence to the
fundamental tenets of social justice).
128. See Justice and the Times, supra note 127, at 5 (suggesting that removal of
the investigating arm of the Soviet criminal justice system from under the direction of
the Procuracy would make the prosecutor's supervision over the pretrial investigation
more objective, complete, and consistent with Gorbachev's policy of strengthening So-
viet legality).
129. Id. Terebilov, noting that his suggestion to eliminate people's assessors in cer-
tain cases goes against the general tenor of legal reform under glasnost, stated bluntly
that the role of lay assessors in uncomplicated cases is simply pro forma. Id. Terebilov
stated that eliminating people's assessors in some cases, which he claimed was consis-
tent with democracy, would create desperately needed time for hearing more complex
cases involving people's assessors. Id.
130. See id. at 6 (stating that defense counsel participation from the initiation of
criminal proceedings is "too early," but suggesting that, when pretrial detention is in-
volved, defense lawyers should participate upon the presentment of the indictment).
131. See Strengthening Socialist Legality, supra note 127, at 8 (claiming that only
a divergence from established legal norms could explain the theft and bribe-taking in
the Soviet criminal justice system exposed by the Soviet press and stating that people
must vigorously fight such corruption in the ministries and departments of the legal
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vance of laws,"'13 2 contending that this would further the process of
perestroika.3 3 More specifically, the resolution called for: (1) a better
and more comprehensive legal education for both working people 3'
and professional legal personnel; 3 5 (2) more scrutinizing attention to
the work done by lawyers, legal consultants, and all officials charged
with enforcing the law; 38 and (3) an end to the biased, callous, and
often indifferent way that preliminary investigations are conducted.1
8
7
In 1987, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a resolu-
tion instructing the USSR Ministry of Justice to adopt all of the re-
forms necessary for a major overhaul of the ministry's legal service pro-
grams for the public. 38  Noting that Soviet citizens have a
constitutional right to a defense, 39 the resolution stated that the legal
aid offices were not performing the services necessary to protect this
right,140 and that the defense services they do provide were substandard
and inadequate. 4 The Presidium also noted that local Soviets and
their executive committees were not exerting adequate pressure and in-
fluence upon the judicial agencies which they were supposed to moni-
tor, such as the legal aid offices." 2 Stating that legal personnel, includ-
system because it violates the interests of Soviet society).
132. Strengthening Socialist Legality, supra note 127, at 8. The Resolution called
upon the Communist Party Central Committees at all levels of the Party hierarchy,
from the territory to the district level, to ensure strict observance of socialist legality.
Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. (stressing that the working class must understand the unity of rights
and obligations).
135. See id. (implying the need for raising the professional qualifications of legal
specialists).
136. See id. (noting that increased attention must be paid to the accuracy and
quality of the work of legal personnel).
137. See id. at 9 (calling for an end to unsubstantiated pretrial detention and ille-
gal criminal indictments).
138. See In the Presidium of The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet-On Judicial Agen-
cies' Work to Provide Legal Service to the Public, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS
No. 30, at 20 (1987) [hereinafter Legal Services] (noting that the judicial agencies
that provide legal services to the Soviet citizenry are in desperate need of qualified
personnel).
139. KONST. SSSR, art. 158, trans. in Legislative Acts of the U.S.S.R., 1977-1979,
Book One, at 68.
140. See Legal Services, supra note 138, at 20 (noting that the USSR Ministry of
Justice receives about 13,000 complaints each year regarding the inefficiency and inef-
fectiveness of its services).
141. See id. (noting that many lawyers do not provide useful assistance because
they are inadequately qualified and often use various excuses to sidestep their duties in
representing defendants).
142. See id. (noting that local executive committees rarely review their agency di-
rectors' reports and devote little energy to fostering the proper working conditions in
which courts and legal aid offices should operate).
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ing many lawyers, have indifferent attitudes toward their duties and/or
are simply incompetent people who abuse their positions,14 3 the resolu-
tion proposed the installation of significantly higher standards for all
personnel in judicial agencies. 4"
As Gorbachev's tenure approached its third anniversary in May
1988, it was clear that the emphasis of his proposals would involve a
new and stronger approach to the application and enforcement of ex-
isting laws. 45 It also appeared that any government proposal for legal
reform would take an exceptionally long time to implement.1 46 This
was evidenced by the fact that many of the reforms that Gorbachev
proposed to the Central Committee in May 1988 echoed the proposals
he made to that same body in early 1986.147 Gorbachev did introduce
for the first time, however, two radical priority proposals: (1) the im-
plementation of an adversarial system into the trial process; 48 and (2)
a steadfast adherence to the principle that all defendants must be pre-
sumed innocent. 149 In addition to Gorbachev's proposals, the Soviet
government also considered preliminary proposals to divide the prose-
cutor's office and the courts into two separate and independent
departments.1 50
The Soviet government's most extensive and detailed slate of propos-
143. See id. (stating that responsible positions in legal agencies are sometimes held
by people who show a predilection for extortion).
144. See id. (proposing that a "spirit of integrity and honesty" should be instilled
in judicial employees).
145. See Polyakou, Toward the 19th All-Union Party, Conference: The Law is
Obliged to Protect, 40 CURRENT DIG. SovIEr PREss No. 19, at 20 (1988) (noting that
Professor G. Minkousky, an honored scholar, jurist, and participant in drafting the new
criminal legislation, has stated that radical, new principles regarding the application of
the law must gain acceptance if the legal restructuring process is to succeed).
Minkousky stated that to facilitate reform, the Soviet legal community must implement
new legal applications recognizing the change from the principle of "anything not per-
mitted is prohibited" to the principle that "anything not prohibited is permitted." Id.
146. Butler, supra note 118, at 1.
147. See Central Committee Hears Gorbachev on Theses-Communique on the Ple-
nary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Part)' of the Soviet Union,
40 CURRENT DIG. SovIEr PRESS No. 21, at 8 (1988) [hereinafter Communique] (call-
ing once again for the formation of a socialist society based upon "the rule of law" and
stressing the need for strict observance of statutory law and general principles of de-
mocracy, especially within the confines of the criminal justice system).
148. See id. (noting that a change to an adversarial system would provide equality
at law for all the parties involved); see also Bialer, supra note 7, at 426 (noting that
the Soviet government has considered ways of restructuring the public defender's office
in a manner that would enhance the rights and ensure the independence of public
defenders).
149. Communique, supra note 147, at 8.
150. See Bialer, supra note 7, at 426 (noting that both the courts and the public
prosecutor's office are currently located within the same agency, the Ministry of
Justice).
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als for legal reform to date was enthusiastically introduced by
Gorbachev in a major address to Party officials in June 1988.11 The
General Secretary once again reiterated and reinforced many of his
past proposals for legal reform,152 including his now characteristic call
for a "socialist state governed by the rule of law.' 3 This time, how-
ever, Gorbachev also outlined a surprising array of new and fairly spe-
cific proposals to reform the criminal justice system.1
5 1
Gorbachev's proposals stressed the need to guarantee the indepen-
dence of judges from outside political influences. 5 The General Secre-
tary proposed extending judicial terms from five years156 to ten years
and permitting only higher level Soviets to have the power to elect
judges. 57 Gorbachev also proposed a reduction of the prosecutor's dis-
tracting tangential duties, so that the prosecutor could concentrate al-
151. On Progress in the Implementation of the Decisions of the 27th C.P.S.U.
Congress and the Tasks of Deepening Restructuring-Report by M.S. Gorbachev Gen-
eral Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, at the 19th All-Union C.P.S.U.
Conference on June 28, 1988, 40 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 26, at 7 (1988)
[hereinafter The Tasks of Deepening Restructuring].
152. See id. at 20 (calling once again for (1) the introduction of the adversarial
principle; (2) equality at law for all parties; (3) the elimination of accusatory bias on
the part of judges; and (4) an uncompromising adherence to a belief in the presump-
tion of innocence principle); see also Butler, supra note 118, at I (implying that
Gorbachev's June 1988 speech to the Party conference mirrored the speech he
presented to the Congress).
153. See The Tasks of Deepening Restructuring, supra note 151, at 19 (claiming
that persistently pushing for the democratization of Soviet society should finally estab-
lish a socialist state where the rule of law governs without question). One new, satisfy-
ing element in Gorbachev's latest proposal for legal reform was that for the first time
in a major address, the General Secretary explained exactly what he meant by the rule
of law when he said:
The principal characteristic of a state governed by the rule of law is that the
supremacy of the law is in fact ensured. No state agency, official, collective,
Party or public organization, and no person is exempt from the duty of submit-
ting to the law. Just as citizens are responsible to their state of all the people, the
state authorities are responsible to the citizens. Their rights should be reliably
protected against any high-handedness on the part of the government and its
representatives.
Id.
154. Id. at 19-20. Before outlining his specific proposals, Gorbachev noted that
many of his proposals are necessary to counteract the extreme legal conservatism that
pervades the Soviet legal system and threatens to undermine his attempts to pursue
democratic social development. Id. at 19. Gorbachev also stressed that while legal re-
structuring is occurring, the principle that "everything that is not prohibited by law is
permitted" must come foremost in everyone's mind. Id.
155. See id. (stating that the Leninist view of the courts' role, which stresses the
independence of judges, must be strictly adhered to so that judges are subordinate only
to the written law).
156. KONST. SSSR, art. 152, trans. in Legislative Acts of the U.S.S.R. 1977-79,
Book One, at 67.
157. The Tasks of Deepening Restructuring, supra note 151, at 19.
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most exclusively on supervising the interpretation and application of
laws within the context of the prosecution process." 8
To facilitate this last proposal, Gorbachev proposed transferring the
majority of the Procuracy's investigative functions to the Ministry of
Internal Affair's investigative branch. 0 9 Gorbachev also validated and
accepted Soviet defense attorneys' request for self-governance within
their profession16 0 and the right to participate more actively in hearing
cases.,61 Finally, in an attempt to expedite and facilitate all of the
above proposals, Gorbachev reemphasized the urgent need to improve
the training,1 2 retraining, 16 3 and compensation of legal experts and
personnel. 64
The 19th All-Union Party Conference adopted all of Gorbachev's
proposals as official government initiatives in the form of conference
resolutions.16 5 The conference resolutions, for example, proposed and
promoted Gorbachev's desire for a criminal trial system that is: adver-
sarial,' 66 open, 67 based on the presumption of innocence, 6 8 and free
from prosecutorial bias. 6" The conference also accepted and expanded
upon how they specifically intended to implement and enforce
158. See id. at 20 (noting that, over the last twenty years, prosecutors have had
many additional duties thrust upon them, resulting in the neglect of their duty to su-
pervise the legality of the prosecutorial process). The Central Committee's resolution
stressed that this situation is intolerable and called for a return to the Leninist position
in which a prosecutors' main function is to supervise the interpretation and application
of Soviet laws. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. (relaying Gorbachev's belief that the creation of a legal bar with the
power to govern itself would further the cause of protecting citizens' rights).
162. See id. (stating that a universal legal education must begin in grammar
schools and continue throughout all schools and institutions of higher learning).
163. Id.
164. See id. (noting that the "material security" of legal personnel is a serious
problem that must be solved).
165. Resolutions of the 19th All-Union C.P.S.U. Conference: On Legal Reform, 40
CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PREss No. 38, at 15 (1988) [hereinafter On Legal Reform]; see
Butler, supra note 118, at 7 (commenting that legal reforms cannot hinder further
social development). The June 1988 Party Conference's endorsement of Gorbachev's
proposals for legal reform invigorated the General Secretary's program of legal restruc-
turing. Id.
166. On Legal Reform, supra note 165, at 15; see F.J.M. FELDERUGGE, supra note
11, at 152 (noting that although these resolutions are intended to be general in nature,
so as to leave the state ample flexibility in implementing them, it is actually the Party
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Gorbachev's proposals: (1) to guarantee the independence of judges,170
(2) to enhance the power and responsibility of people's assessors,171 (3)
to restore the prosecutor to a purely supervisory role, 1 2 (4) to create a
self-governing bar of defense lawyers, 173 and (5) to upgrade the level of
education maintained by all personnel serving in judicial agencies. 174
When the Central Committee met in a plenary session in the latter
part of July 1988, they officially adopted the resolutions passed by the
Party Conference and set an ambitious implementation deadline of
mid-1989.175 The Committee-stated that the revision of traditional judi-
cial penalities, including the narrowing of the number of offenses sub-
ject to criminal liability was of great importance.7 8 In addition, the
Central Committee boldly predicted that the reorganization of the
court system would only require a short period of time.177 They also
mentioned the draft laws for the improvement of the bar and the pre-
trial investigation period, stating that discussion of these drafts would
170. See id. (enumerating Gorbachev's proposed goals for Soviet legal reform). In
order to guarantee unconditional judicial independence, the Conference stated: (1) that
the CPSU Central Committee would set specific sanctions enforceable against anyone
attempting to interfere in any activity of the court, and (2) that higher level Soviets
should elect judges for longer terms of office. Id.
171. See id. (recommending an increase in the number of people's assessors in com-
plex cases); see also Butler, supra note 118, at 8 (noting that the conference proposed
to increase the number of lay assessors used in certain cases from the current two to six
or possibly twelve). Many people misconstrued this as the introduction of a jury sys-
tem. Id.
172. See On Legal Reform, supra note 165, at 15 (noting a resolute intention to
recreate the "Leninist prosecutor"). This prosecutor's sole function is to "monitor the
application of Soviet flaws and vehemently attack any violations of socialist legality."
Id.; see also Butler, supra note 118, at 8 (noting that on May 23, 1988, A. Ia.
Sukhareu, who was not a career procurator, was appointed as the new Procurator Gen-
eral). This foreshadows the possibility that eventually the Procuracy will have supervi-
sory, but not investigative duties. Id.
173. On Legal Reform, supra note 165, at 15.
174. See id. (describing conference suggestions for improving the quality of legal
education). These suggestions included: (1) increasing the number of students who at-
tend school on a full-time basis, (2) placing more emphasis on clinical courses, and (3)
stressing the importance of independent thought and comparative law. Id.
175. See Resolution of the Plenary Session of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee: On
Practical Work to Implement the Decision of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, 40
CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESs No. 30, at 9 (1988) (stating the Central Committee's
goal of legal reform). The resolution of the Central Committee stated specifically that
their aim was to implement judicial reform in the Prosecutor's Office, the courts of
arbitration, the investigative agencies, the bar and legal services, and in criminal legis-
lation. Id.
176. See id. (stating that it is important for penalties not requiring the deprivation
of freedom to have a broader application).
177. Communique on the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, 40 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 30, at 4
(1988). The CPSU Central Committee stated that legal reform is firmly linked to the
democratization of the Soviets' activity. Id.
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take place "in the near future."""8 The Central Committee made simi-
lar predictions regarding the improvement of legal services and the in-
troduction of universal legal education for the entire USSR. 17
IV. IMPLEMENTED GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS FOR
LEGAL REFORM, 1986-1988
A. DIRECTIVES OF THE USSR SUPREME COURT
Despite the Gorbachev regime's numerous and revolutionary propos-
als for legal reform of the Soviet criminal justice system, only a few of
these proposed reforms actually reached the legislative implementation
stage by the autumn of 1988.1o The minimal number of reforms en-
acted before the fall of 1988 were implemented not by Soviet legisla-
tures, but through directives or "leading explanations" issued by ple-
nary sessions of the USSR Supreme Court." 1 The Soviet government
treats these leading explanations as valid sources of law. 8 '
As early as the spring of 1986, the USSR Supreme Court, in plenary
session, began issuing very general directives designed to instill the idea
of socialist legality and a "strict observance of the laws" within the
lower courts.18 3 The court demanded, for example, that all courts must
decide guilt on an individual basis in order to avoid false convictions."8 '
Furthermore, V.I. Terebilov, the chairman of the USSR Supreme
Court, stated that judges should no longer simply apply the old, stere-
otypical, proforma assessments of legal situtations that base themselves
on any normative acts that contradict the Soviet Constitution. 85
178. Id.
179. Id. The Committee suggested the possibility that these acts would be adopted
by the end of 1988. Id.
180. Butler, supra note 118, at 1.
181. See F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 11, at 743 (noting that the Supreme
Court's ability to issue "guiding" or "leading explanations" during their plenary ses-
sions gives them quasi-legislative power to indicate how various court rules .and proce-
dure should be interpreted and applied). These are binding upon all lower courts. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Plenary Session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court, 38 CURRENT DIG. So-
VIET PRESS No. 16, at 22 (1986) (stating that a "strict observance of the laws" can
bring about a realization of the democratic tenets of justice and citizens' equality with-
out regard to official rank).
184. See id. (stating that false convictions are the most blatant violations of the
law). The Soviet Supreme Court held that in every case of a false conviction, "a citi-
zen's honor and dignity [must] be fully restored, along with his employment, property,
housing and other rights." id.
185. Report on the Activity of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court-Report by Deputy V.
L Terebilov, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court, 40 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET
PRESS No. 23, at 13 (1988). The Chairman suggested that new, unconventional assess-
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Additional directives were issued by the Supreme Court in its De-
cember 1986 Plenary Session. This session was a reaction to the Cen-
tral Committee's adoption of a resolution entitled "On Further
Strengthening Socialist Legality and Law and Order and Increasing
the Protection of Citizens' Rights and Legitimate Interests"'' 88 and pro-
duced directives that were more forceful and specific. 187 These direc-
tives sought to regulate the pretrial period more vigorously by denying
pretrial detention whenever it is unwarranted' 8 and by reducing the
courts' power to add or cut time from the investigation period without
sufficient justification. 8 9 When it is impossible to obtain the evidence
needed to support an indictment, the Supreme Court stated that a
court can exercise only one option; acquittal. 90 The Court also stressed
that judges, regardless of their personal preference, must conduct open
trials and do not have the option to restrict public access to the trial
process.' 91 Finally, the Supreme Court rejected blanket judgments and
emphasized that all courts must take the specific circumstances of each
case into consideration and make a committed effort to individualize
penalties. 92
In April 1987, the USSR Supreme Court, in plenary session, issued
another series of very pointed directives aimed almost exclusively at
reforming the pro forma role played by most people's assessors.9 3 The
Supreme Court stated unequivocally that under no circumstances
should professional judges restrict the rights, powers, or duties of peo-
ple's assessors. 94 In particular, the Supreme Court strongly urged peo-
ple's assessors to exercise their power of dissent through their vote and
ments of legal issues must be applied by Soviet courts. Id.
186. Strengthening Socialist Legality, supra note 127, at 8.
187. See Plenary Session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court, 38 CURRENT Dia. So-
VIET PRESS No. 50, at 1 (1986) (enumerating and explaining these specific directives).
188. See id. (noting that the Court is required to take steps to remedy unwarranted
pretrial detention and is obligated to remand these cases for additional investigation).
189. See id. (forbidding courts to remand cases for further investigation when there
is a lack of evidence to support an indictment).
190. Id.
191. See id. at 2 (noting that every person has a right to take notes in a courtroom
during a trial, but they must receive the presiding judge's permission to use any cam-
eras or video equipment).
192. Id.
193. See Plenary Session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court, 39 CURRENT DIG. SO-
VIET PRESS No. 15, at 17 (1987) (observing that the Soviet Supreme Court does not
look favorably on those judges who underestimate the function of the people's
assessors).
194. See id. (noting that all court members, irrespective of their status as a profes-
sional judge or lay assessor, must jointly and equally decide upon all questions dealing
with the establishment of facts, the identification of the defendant, and the reasons and
conditions surrounding the violation).
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through dissenting opinions.195 The Court emphasized that a profes-
sional judge's failure to abide by legislation requiring active participa-
tion of people's assessors in the adjudication process is a fundamental
violation which constitutes possible grounds for the reversal of a deci-
sion and/or the penalization of the guilty officials. 1 6
B. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Excluding the USSR Supreme Court's promulgation of a handful of
directives, the only substantial government proposals for legal reform
that were implemented by the close of 1988 were several amendments
to the Constitution of the USSR which the government ratified in De-
cember of 1988.197 One, however, cannot underestimate the importance
of the changes made in chapter 20, article 152 of the Soviet Constitu-
tion, which prescribes the length of term for both people's judges and
people's assessors.198 Under the old article 152, which was adopted in
the new Soviet Constitution of 1977-78, people's judges and people's
assessors served five year and two and a half year terms, respectively.1 19
The December 1988 amendments extended these terms to ten years for
people's judges and five years for lay assessors.20 As Gorbachev has
noted, the purpose of this change was to ensure the independence of
judges. 01
The second major change in article 152 was the addition of three
new paragraphs that change the governmental level from which judges
and people's assessors are chosen.20 2 Under the new additions, the ap-
propriate Soviets of People's Deputies will elect the courts on the corre-
195. See id. (stating that a people's assessor has a "moral obligation" to utilize his
legal right to voice his difference of opinion in writing and suggest a possible alterna-
tive judgement).
196. Id. at 18.
197. Law on Constitutional Amendments, Pravda, Dec. 3, 1988, at 1-2, reprinted
in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO. SERV. Soviet Union, Dec. 5, 1988, at 48, 56 [hereinafter
Constitutional Amendments].
198. See Communique on Meetings of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, 40 CURRENT
DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 48, at 1, 9 (1988) [hereinafter Nov. 30th Communique] (not-
ing Gorbachev's belief that the constitutional amendments are important because they
help ensure the independence, objectivity, and impartiality of judges).
199. KoNsr. SSSR, art. 152, trans. in Legislative Acts of the U.S.S.R. 1977-1979,
Book One, at 67.
200. Constitutional Amendments, supra note 197, at 56.
201. November 30th Communique, supra note 198, at 9.
202. Constitutional Amendments, supra note 197, at 56. Gorbachev has stated that
these additions are important because "[t]he independence of the courts is determined
largely by the way in which they are formed." November 30th Communique, supra
note 198, at 9.
1990]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
sponding district, city, regional, provincial, and territorial levels. 203 As
a result, the higher-level Soviets will elect the judges, while the general
public will elect lay or people's assessors in an open vote, either at their
residence or at their place of work. 04
V. RECENT GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS FOR LEGAL
REFORM AND IMPLEMENTED REFORMS
The creation of USSR Lawyers' Union was the first major legal re-
form enacted in February 1989.205 By January 1990, the Union had
already united approximately 20,000 defense lawyers.2 6 Unlike the So-
viet bar which is governed by the Ministry of Justice,01 this new union
is an independent, self-governing organization in which members be-
long on an individual basis.20
One of the goals of this unprecedented organization is to unite law-
yers who, by working together, can help to create a state based on the
rule of law.2 09 To further this goal, according to Georgy Alekseyevich
Voskresensky, Chairman of the Board of the USSR Lawyers' Union,
the existence of a strong, independent and uncompromised coalition of
lawyers is required.2 10 But, says Voskfesensky, such a coalition will not
flourish until defense lawyers are removed from their subordination to
state agencies. 1 '
One of the most extensive draft laws under discussion in early 1989
was the draft law entitled "On the Status of Judges. 212 Finally
203. November 30th Communique, supra note 198, at 9. Gorbachev drew attention
to the fact that higher level Soviets will now elect people's courts, which is a result of
the people's desire to ensure that the work of judges is free from intervention by local
authorities. Id.
204. See id. (emphasizing Gorbachev's belief that as a result of this voting arrange-
ment, the people will elect [t]he assessor, representatives will elect the judges).
205. U.S.S.R. Lawyers' Union Created, 41 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 8, at
22 (1989).
206. See Do Defense Lawyers Need Defense, 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No.
1, at 27 (1990) [hereinafter Defense Lawyers] (noting that the overwhelming majority
of defense lawyers have joined this union).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Lawyers Union Formed, 40 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No. 46, at 21
(1988) (listing Lawyer's Union's goals). The new Lawyer's Union will also interact
with other existing legal groups, represent lawyers rights, and band with similar groups
in other socialist countries. Id.
210. See Defense Lawyers, supra note 206, at 27 (stating that this type of coalition
is an indespensable condition for the creation of a law-governed state).
211. See id. (stating that, as long as defense lawyers are subordinate to state agen-
cies, they cannot be independent).
212. See on the Courts Independence and Judges Prestige, 41 CURRENT DIG. So-
VIET PRESS No. 12, at 26 (1989) [hereinafter Independence and Prestige] (stating that
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adopted by the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of the
Union and Council of Nationalities on August 4, 1989,213 this new law
reinforces article 155 of the Soviet Constitution.2  This reinforcement
arises out of the fundamental guarantees in this new law that are
aimed at ensuring the independence of judges and people's assessors,215
and the impartiality of the judiciary in general.
216
In late May 1989, Gorbachev addressed the full membership of the
USSR Supreme Soviet and updated them on the progress of his pro-
gram of restructuring.217 Gorbachev referred to many of the same
broad themes and proposals he had been discussing for the previous
four years. 218 This time, however, Gorbachev added a startling new
proposition to his list of reforms when he unexpectedly mentioned that
he was seriously considering the introduction of trial by jury." '
Gorbachev also noted, with urgency, the need to accelerate his plans
for restructuring in order to combat the rising rate of crime, including
corruption, extortion, and bribery, factors threatening to destroy the
foundations of Soviet society.
220
The USSR Supreme Court submitted their most recent draft laws to
the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet in July 1989 for considera-
tion.2 21 The drafts elaborated on a proposal to increase the number of
judges and people's assessors in important, complex cases. 2 22 Another
the USSR Supreme Court members helped draft this law).
213. Time Of Bold Decisions, 41 CURRENT DIG. SoviET PRESS No. 38, at 18
(1989) [hereinafter Bold Decisions].
214. KONST. SSSR, art. 155, trans. in Legislative Acts of the U.S.S.R. 1977-1979,
Book One, at 68.
215. Independence and Prestige, supra note 212, at 26.
216. Bold Decisions, supra note 213, at 18.
217. On the Basic Guidelines of the U.S.S.R.'s Domestic and Foreign Policy, 41
CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PREss No. 25, at 1 (1989) [hereinafter Basic Guidelines].
218. See id. at 7 (noting Gorbachev's desire to expand legal education, increase the
financial compensation of all judicial employees, and ensure strict adherence to the
law).
219. See id. (noting that Gorbachev received applause from the USSR Supreme
Soviet when he suggested the possibility of implementing trial by jury).
220. Id.
221. See What Kind Of Court Do We Need? 41 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS No.
28, at 23 (1989) (noting the lack of public discussion on these drafts because the press
has no permission to publish the drafts, which is why the Chairman of the USSR
Supreme Court agreed to discuss them with a Pravda reporter). The two legislative
acts that the USSR Supreme Court submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet for con-
sideration were: "Principles of USSR and Union-Republic Legislation on the Judicial
System, and a Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR." Id. The purpose of the later
draft was inter alia, to increase the prestige of the judicial system, guarantee the inde-
pendence and impartiality of the judiciary, and outline the requirements that must be
met by candidates for the bench. Id.
222. Id.
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proposal suggested expanding the bench to either two judges and three
lay assessors or to one judge and four assessors. 223 The draft principles
also explicitly stipulated for the first time that all citizens, no matter
what their official Party position, are equal before the law.224 Also in-
troduced in print for the first time was the presumption of innocence
principle.225
Conspicuously missing from the new draft laws, however, was any
proposal to revive trial by jury within the Soviet Union. 2 6 Despite
Gorbachev's earlier reference to his possible support of a trial by jury,
the new chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, Yevgeny Alekseyevich
Smolentsev,227 voiced strong opposition to any notion of re-introducing
trial by jury.228 Smolentsev, although acknowledging certain problems
with the Soviet system of using people's assessors, maintained that the
substantial benefits of using people's assessors negate any possible dis-
advantages that their use might create.229
Something or someone changed Smolentsev's views very quickly. On
November 2, 1989, Smolentsev presented various draft laws on the ju-
dicial system to the USSR Supreme Soviet, including a proposal for
the introduction of trial by jury. 0 More startling than the proposal
itself, however, was the fact that within less than two weeks after
Smolentsev's proposal of a limited form of trial by jury was officially
approved and enacted into law by the Supreme Soviet.231 The new law
states that in cases involving crimes that, by law, warrant either the
223. Id.
224. See id. (noting that in the recent past many citizens guilty of committing
various degrees of crime have avoided the prosecution process because of their high
official positions).
225. Id. The new "Presumption of Innocence" provision states that "[tihe accused
is presumed innocent until his guilt is proven in the manner prescribed by law and
established by a court judgement that has entered into legal force." Id.
226. See id. (noting that both scholars and commentators on public affairs have
suggested reviving the practice of trial by jury in the Soviet Union).
227. See Congress of People's Deputies, Day 11 (cont.), 41 CURRENT DIG. SovIET
PRESS No. 32, at 16 (1989) (noting that the USSR Supreme Soviet's election of
Yevgeny Alekseyevich Smolentsev as the new Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court
was confirmed by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies on June 8, 1989).
228. See id. (noting that Smolentsev's contention that the civilized world is re-
jecting the idea of trial by jury as an "archaic and inefficient" practice).
229. See id. (noting Smolentsev's assertion that the advantage of using people's
assessors is that they, in his belief, have all the rights of a judge). The disadvantage is
that instead of choosing the best qualified citizens to serve as people's assessors, people
are often chosen to serve as lay assessors because they "are more dispensable than
others at their factories or offices." Id.
230. A Step Toward A State Based On The Rule Of Law, 41 CURRENT DiG. So-
VIET PRESS No. 44, at 15 (1989).
231. Justice Minister Reviews Court Reform, 41 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PREss No.
50, at 18-19 (1989) [hereinafter Justice Minister].
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death penalty or incarceration for more than 10 years, "the question of
the defendant's guilt may be decided by a jury" (an expanded panel of
people's assessors) (emphasis added).23 2 Although its implementation
will raise many procedural questions, 33 this fundamentally different
form of court procedure will enrich the legal system and elevate-the
level of justice.
23 4
The new law on jury trials was just one, of several new, drastically
revolutionary laws intended to overhaul the criminal justice system that
was adopted by the Supreme Soviet in an extraordinary piece of legis-
lation entitled "Principles on USSR and Union-Republic Legislation on
the Judicial System. ' 235 Article 9 of this legislation states that
"[j]udges and people's assessors shall be independent and shall be
subordinate only to the law. ' 236 Despite the principled words of article
9, the frank reality is that old wielders of Party influence will hesitate
to relinquish their power,237 making genuine judicial independence a
difficult goal to attain.233 If history is a guide, this outlook does not
improve, considering the fact that almost the exact same words that
appear in article 9 have long been clearly delineated in article 155 of
the Constitution of the USSR,239 but have fallen on deaf Party ears.240
Article 14 of the November 13th legislation delineated two addi-
tional fundamental and long overdue rights for defendants.41 The first
section of this article, which states that all suspects, accused persons
and defendants have a right to a defense through legal assistance, 242 is
232. Principles of USSR and Union-Republic Legislation on the Judicial System,
art. 11, trans. in Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 19.
233. See Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 19 (noting that those Union republics
that decide to implement this quasi-jury trial system will have to: (1) develop the pro-
cedural laws relating to this system; (2) settle questions regarding the appeal process
and the administration of this system; (3) develop voting procedures for the jury; and
(4) determine questions of jury size).
234. Id.
235. See Principles of USSR and Union-Republic Legislation on the Judicial Sys-
tem, arts. 9, 11, 13, & 14, trans. in Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 19.
236. Principles of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on the Judicial System,
art. 9, trans. in Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 19.
237. Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 18 (noting that Party bosses at various
levels-from the bottom to the top of the hierarchial Party ladder--"are used to being
in charge of everything, including justice").
238. Id.
239. KONST. SSSR, art. 155, trans. in Legislative Acts of the USSR, 1977-1979,
Book One, at 68. This article states that "[j]udges and people's assessors are indepen-
dent and subject only to the law." Id.
240. Supra notes 57-67.
241. Principles of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on the Judicial System,
art. 14, trans. in Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 19.
242. Id.
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an expansion of article 158 of the Soviet Constitution, which had only
granted this right to people formally charged as "defendants." ' 43 More
importantly, however, this section specifically states, for the first time,
that a defense lawyer has the right to participate in the preliminary
investigation "from the moment of detention, arrest or filing of
charges. 24 Although defense lawyers welcome this norm,2 " they as-
sert that this new right will only become effective when they are per-
mitted to extensively review files and meet privately with clients.'" Fi-
nally, the second section of article 14 explicitly states, also for the first
time, that the "presumption of innocence" doctrine, a fundamental le-
gal principle of the Western world that traditionally has been vehe-
mently rejected by most members of the Soviet judiciary,2 47 must be
applied in all Soviet courtrooms. 48
In addition to the momentous legislation enacted on November 13th,
various draft law provisions still under consideration address the issues
of "liability for contempt of court . . . noninterference in the settle-
ment of cases, and the inviolability of judges and people's assessors. '24
Another important draft provision imposes liability upon anyone who
attempts to influence any decision of a judge or lay assessor through
the use of the mass media. 50 One draft law includes provisions that
address the question of a judge's compensation and benefits,251 which
are pathetically2 52 and embarassingly low.2 53 Finally, intensive work is
243. KONST. SSSR, art. 158, trans. in Legislative Acts of the USSR, 1977-1979,
Book One, at 68. This article states that "[a] defendant in a criminal action is guaran-
teed the right to legal assistance."
244. Principles of USSR and Union Republics Legislation on the Judicial System,
art. 14, trans. in Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 19. This means that a lawyer now
needs to devote much more time participating in the preliminary investigation than he
currently spends just reviewing case files and appearing in court for the hearing of the
case. Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 18.
245. Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 28.
246. See id. (asserting the opinion of Georgy Voskresensky, Chairman of the Board
of the USSR Lawyer's Union).
247. Principles of USSR and Union Republics Legislation on the Judicial System,
art. 14, trans. in Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 19.
248. Supra notes 54-56.
249. Independence and Prestige, supra note 212, at 26.
250. See id. (adding that publishing news of a crime may influence a court's
decision).
251. See id. (noting that disciplinary standards for judges and procedures for nomi-
nating judicial candidates and their subsequent swearing-in are also issues addressed in
the draft law).
252. Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 18 (asserting that 200 rubles per month
for a person who carries a colossal workload and a burden of immense responsibility is
ridiculous).
253. See id. (noting that the USSR Minister of Justice, V. Yakovlev, feels like
"sinking through the floor" when his foreign colleagues ask about judges' salaries in the
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also in progress on a draft law dealing with reform of the laws on cor-
rective labor, a reform whose main thrust is to make sentences more
humane.2 '
CONCLUSION
That the Soviet government has tolerated and agreed with a great
amount of the overwhelming number of criticisms that the Soviet crim-
inal justice system has received in the last five years is, in itself, a trib-
ute to Gorbachev's policy of glasnost. The wide ranging revolutionary
proposals for reform of the Soviet criminal justice system advanced
during Gorbachev's tenure are unprecedented and long overdue.
Change in the Soviet Union, however, especially when it involves the
restructuring of ingrained legal norms and procedures through the leg-
islative process, is a slow and arduous task. Although many members of
the Soviet government, the legal community, the academic world, and
the press corps realize that reform in the criminal justice system is des-
perately needed, the spirit of conservatism that pervades every aspect
of Soviet society is a difficult and often impossible force to overcome.
Despite these potentially daunting obstacles, Mikhail Sergeevich
Gorbachev has, to the amazement of many observers, including this
author, succeeded in transforming a substantial number of his propos-
als for reform of the criminal justice system into legitimate, state-man-
dated reforms. Whether these reforms can be enforced, however, is still
to be determined. Nevertheless, even if all of these reforms are vali-
dated through successful implementation, there is still much more work
to be done before the Soviet criminal justice system is totally free of its
archaic and oppressive characteristics. This sentiment was candidly ex-
pressed in late November of 1989 by V. Yakovlev, the USSR Minister
of Justice, when he stated that:
[A] new atmosphere, a new attitude, new salaries, new physical conditions, new
laws will gradually form the only climate in which the tree of true, independent
justice can grow. That tree will grow; I am convinced of this. But it will take
time, colossal efforts, and sanctions: People must be held accountable for disre-
spect for the courts. But this is a very complicated question, so, in essence, we
will have to be prepared to fight for the future of justice.21 5
Soviet Union).
254. See id. (noting that this draft law attempts to increase the effectiveness of
sentences, especially in regard to punitive measures).
255. Justice Minister, supra note 231, at 18.
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